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Of the international requisites of a divorce obtained in a state
where one party only is domiciled.
Tim.most important inquiry connected with this subject is now
to be solved, viz., what are the requisites of a divorce, obtained in
the domicile of one party only, to entitle it to be held valid in
every other country, than that where rendered ? Can it be obtained
without any appearance by, or service of process or notice on, the
non-resident respondent, save, perhaps, such publication as is
required by the laws of the state granting the divorce, as Mr.
Bishop holds, or is it limited by the more rigid rule laid down by
Judge REDFIELD in the Am. Law Reg., supra, and in his edition
of Story's Confl. of L., § 229 b, viz., that it is generally agreed
that a valid judgment of divorce rendered in one state is valid in
every other, "if the respondent was duly and actually served with
process, cr appeared voluntarily, and submitted to the jurisdiction?"
Mr. 14harton (Confl. of L., § 232) takes the intermediate position, thut only personal notice to the defendant, "if his whereabouts can be ascertained," is requisite.
As regards this view it is not very apparent how mere notice can
avail in any way, except perhaps as a make-weight to turn the
scale in a doubtful case. If Mr. Bishop is correct, it is unnecesVOL. XXV.-25
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sary. If judgments in divorce are on the footing of other foreign
judgments, as Judge REDFIELD maintains, then a defendant cannot be compelled to resort to a foreign tribunal to contest his personal rights and such notice is null and void of any effect: Bisecof
v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812; 3 Am. L. Reg. 210. Neither do the
two cases in Pennsylvania support Mr. Wharton's position, though
Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121, does. He seems to ignore the
distinction between service of process and notice, two very different
things.
The discussion is then narrowed down to the very opposite views
of the two other eminent writers above mentioned, on a comparison of which we enter with diffidence; "non nobi8 tanta8 componere
lites."

Judge REDFIELD has stated with great force his principles and
conclusions; they are briefly as follows:No foreign judgment can be valid unless the court rendering it
had "complete jurisdiction, both of the subject-matter and of both
the parties ;" to such jurisdiction over parties their actual or constructive presence within its limits is indispensable, which last is
constituted by appearance or service of process within the jurisdiction of the forum. And in these respects judgments in divorce
are like other foreign judgments. The provision in the Constitution of the United States and the Act of Congress, giving judgments
and judicial proceedings in one state the same force and effect in
every other state as where rendered, as regards judgments rendered
between party and party, applies only where there is full jurisdiction over both parties. Divorce proceedings are not in ren, but
inter partes.
In support of these propositions numerous cases are cited, the
latest of which is a7heever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, also cited and
relied on by Mr. Bishop.
This important case deserves analysis. The marriage, the marriage domicile, and the delictum were in the District of Columbia,
where the husband remained; the wife went to Indiana and there
instituted proceedings in divorce to which the husband appeared.
The divorce so obtained was declared good on appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The court said, "The petition laid the proper
foundation for the subsequent proceedings. It warranted the exercise of the authority which was invoked. The court was the
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proper one before which to bring the case. It had jurisdiction of
the parties and the subject-matter. The decree was valid and
effectual according to the law and adjudications in Indiana. The
Constitution and Laws of the United States give the decree the
same effect elsewhere which it had in Indiana. If a judgment is
conclusive in the state where it is rendered, it is equally conclusive
everywhere in the courts of the United States."
We do not find that it is anywhere in the opinion " expressly
held," as Judge REDFIELD says (Story, supra, § 229 b), that such
judgment is valid, if the respondent was duly and actually served
with process, or appeared voluntarily and submitted to the jurisdiction."
How far this is a fair inference from the whole opinion, and the
facts of the case, is doubtful. The court cited and relied on Ditson v. Ditson, 4 11. I. 87, a case which Judge REDFIELD strongly
condemns, and Mr. Bishop as strongly approves, and which is
directly contrary to Judge REDFIELD'S interpretation of the
opinion.
Chief Justice SHAW'S opinion in Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray 369, is
relied on by Judge REDFIELD as showing that a decree of divorce
is void if the foreign court had not jurisdiction "of both the parties." This was a dictum, as the point did not arise, the facts
being in the case that the court pronouncing the divorce had properly no jurisdiction of either party. But in Harteauv. ffarteau,
14 Pickering 181, C. J. SHAw held that jurisdiction of both parties
was not always necessary to the validity of a divorce. See also
,Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158.
In the 5th edition (1878) of his work on Marriage and Divorce,
Mr. Bishop comments with some asperity on Judge REDFIELD'S
opinions as stated above, and criticises very forcibly the cases on
which he relies. Some of these cases, as we have pointed out,
were decided prior to the adoption of the doctrine of separate
domicile, and are no longer of authority.
In opposition to Judge REDFIELD Mr. Bishop holds that to entitle a court to jurisdiction, as regards the parties, it is sufficient
for one of them to be domiciled in the country, nor is it necessary
to serve a citation personally on the defendant, where the plaintiff
is so domiciled, if such personal service cannot be made: Vol. 2,
§ 155. He considers that appearance by a defendant cannot give
a court jurisdiction which it would not otherwise have. Id., § 163.
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Elsewhere he seems to think appearance by a defendant very
important as regards the effect of the divorce on property, &c. : Id.,
§§ 170, 199 c. le then proceeds to a thorough discussion of the
question, which we will endeavor to state briefly.
The principle that for purposes of divorce husband and wife may
have separate domiciles leads naturally to another, namely, that
the domicile of either may entertain the jurisdiction. Otherwise
both states would be deprived of the right to determine the status
of their own subjects. Still, "probably the decree is not directly
binding upon the person of such subject" (i. e., of the other state),
unless be appears and answers to the suit, or, at least, h~as notice
of it served upon him within the jurisdiction of the court rendering
it. " "He only ceases to be a husband because he has ceased to
have a wife." He is in the same position as if she were to die.
It is true that a court must have jurisdiction of the person and
subject-matter to make its judgment binding, but when a person
is domiciled within a country its courts have jurisdiction of his
person and the subject-matter, viz., his status, and on this alone
they act when they declare him free from the bond of matrimony
with one abroad. " Courts are bound to redress the wrongs of
citizens, while the right of defendants to be cited is secondary."
Judgments in rem and quasiin rem, bind the property of the defendant without actual notice to him. A suit to fix the status of a
citizen is in its nature a proceeding in rem, the thing being, not a
piece of property, but a status: § 164. Where husband and wife
are separated the marriage is a mere theoretical thing, an impediment to actual matrimony. Want of personal citation of defendant
within the country is a mere technical objection. The separation
of domiciles is the result of violation of the marriage duties, and
the offender who attempts to avail himself of it endeavors to take
advantage of his own wrong to protect himself from the punishment for it: §§ 167, 168.
Mr. Bishop then proceeds to examine and discuss the cases
which support his views, citing largely from the opinions in them.
Of these the first is Hardingv. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140. In this
case the parties were married in Massachusetts, and lived in Maine,
where the husband deserted his wife and went to North Carolina,
where be committed adultery. The wife went to Rhode Island,
where she instituted divorce proceedings and notice was served on
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the husband in North Carolina. The divorce thus obtained was
held good in Maine.
The opinion in this case would scen to indicate that the court
considered the proceedings quasi in ren. It was the "interest"
of the husband in his wife, "his right to exact from her the performance of duties upon which the decree operated. She was
within the jurisdiction."
The wife, it should be remembered, was the libellant. "Most
of the reasons which led to the rule that a marriage valid by the
law of the place where solemnized should be valid everywhere, the
protection of innocent parties, and the purity of public morals.
require that divorces lawfully pronounced in one jurisdiction, and
the new relation thereupon formed, should be recognised as operative and binding everywhere."
To refuse effect to such decrees is also productive of great
inconvenience and even of denial of justice unless the injured
party can follow the offender and acquire domicile in the same
state A decree in divorce does not fall within the rule that a
judgment against one not within a state, nor bound by its laws,
nor amenable to its jurisdiction, is not entitled to credit in another
state. See 2 Kent 110, note b, where this decision is mentioned
and approved by the great jurist.
.Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87, is the next case taken up. In this
case the libellant, a citizen of Rhode Island, married in New York an
Englishman. He deserted her in Massachusetts, and never was in
Rhode Island; he had no notice of the proceedings, his abode being
unknown. The jurisdiction was entertained on the ground that it
was enough to have jurisdiction over the petitioner alone to decree
a divorce, upon such "personal or constructive" notice to the other
party, "whether in or out of the state," as is possible or customary.
The decision was grounded both on the statute law of Rhode
Island and the general law. AMEs, J., delivering the opinion, said,
"The right to govern and control persons and things within the
state supposes the right in a just and proper manner to fix and
alter the status of the one, and to regulate and control the disposition of the other, nor is this sovereign power over persons and
things placed within the jurisdiction of the state diminished by the
fact that there are other parties interested through some relation
in the status of these persons, or by some claim or right in those
things, who are out of the jurisdiction, and cannot be reached by
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its process. No one doubts this as a matter of general law with
regard to the other domestic relations, and what special reason is
there to doubt it as to the relation of husband and wife ?" The
learned judge illustrates this by the effect oh the status of a slave
produced by his escape to another country. A state should give
to non-residents and foreigners, parties to a marriage, or interested
in property within its territory, such judicial notice as can be given
consistently with effective judicial action.
" To say that the general law inexorably demands personal notice in order to such action, or, still worse, demands ihat all parties
interested in a relation, or in property subject to a jurisdiction,
should be physically within that jurisdiction, is to lay down a rule
of law incapable of execution, or to make the execution of laws
dependent, not upon the claims of justice, but upon the chance
locality, or, what is worse, upon the will of those most interested
to defeat it."
A number of other cases are cited and commented on by Mr.
Bishop, §§ 163 a, note 1, 164, &c., chief of which is C]ieever v.
Wilson, 9 Wall. 108, which we have already examined. In this
case there was an appearance by the defendant, which Mr. Bishop
(§ 163 a) thinks not material, as appearance, he holds, could not
give the court a jurisdiction which it had not without appearance.
"On the other hand," he says, "the court refer merely to the
discussions of the present work, and to Ditson v. Ditson, in which
appearance, or even notice, except the constructive notice by
publication, was expressly held to be unnecessary."
In regard to this point it seems to us that both Mr. Bishop's
and Judge REDFIELD'S interpretations of the opinion in Cheever
v. Wilson are unwarranted by the language of it and the facts of
the case. The point whether appearance or summons was necessary did not arise, and it is open to argument how far the fact of
appearance by the defendant was a material element in the decision.
Certainly it was not "expressly held" to be so, as Judge REDFIELD
asserts, nor, on the other hand, does Mr. Bishop point out why it
was not " deemed material," or where.
Criticism of Mr. Bishop's views, on general principles.
Notwithstanding the strength of Mr. Bishop's arguments, well
sustained as they are by his authorities, his views seem open to
criticism. Whatever force such criticism may have will depend
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Oi principles elaborated at the outset of this discussion, to which
it will therefore be needful to recur briefly.
Dissolution of a marriage is a matter which vitally concerns the
state, and of which therefore it takes sole and entire control.
While the marriage could be dissolved but in one domicile, that
of the husband, such abrogation of it could seldom give rise to
questions elsewhere; but the operation of this principle in many
cases was productive of great injustice to wives, to remedy which
the doctrine of separate domicile of parties in divorce proceedings
was introduced. Instantly there arose the conflict of jurisdiction
between the domiciles of the two parties of such frequent occurrence
in foreign divorces, and whose absurd and shocking results have
been fully set forth. The welfare of all civilized communities demands that this should cease as far as possible, and it is well establislied that the rights of the state in which the divorce suit is not
carried on must be disregarded, if the party to the marriage resident in that state has either voluntarily submitted his cause to the
foreign tribunal where the divorce is sought, or, while within the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction, has been legally called before
such tribunal.
This is the universal rule, in the United States at least: Redfield, supra; Wharton Confi. of L., § 232, &c. Mr. Bishop
goes farther, and lays down that even though the party respondent
have notice only, out of the jurisdiction, or even have no notice
at all, of the proceedings in divorce, such divorce, if good in the
state where obtained, is good as regards the party in whose favor
it was given everywhere, even though other states may properly
decline to recognise it as to the person of the other party, and as
to property within their limits: 2 Bishop, &c., § 199 c.
Now it would seem, if the rights of the state in which a respondent lives are put in abeyance by a divorce proceeding elsewhere,
as is now agreed, that as regards the respondent such proceeding
is on the footing of any other personal action, for, as we have seen,
the chief distinction between divorce causes and most others is,
that the state is a party interested in the former, while the others
Evidently this is so.
are purely matters of private concern.
But it is an elementary principle of law that no judgment in
personam can bind in any way a person not a party to the suit,
nor within the jurisdiction of the court: 2 Bishop, &c., § 159 ;
D'Arey v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165. Further, how can such judg-
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ment have any effect at all? As regards the absent party it is
given in violation of the clearest principles of justice: 2 Kent 109 ;
nor will it be helped by saying that the state in which such judgment is rendered has rights to be vindicated in the person of its
inhabitant. So also the state where the other party of the marriage
resides has equal and similar rights, nor is there any reason why
these should be disregarded on account of those of another state.
If the judgment affects one, it must affect the other party.
The insuperable difficulty, as it appears to us, in giving effect on
principle and reason to such ex parte divorces as those under discussion, is, that from the very nature of the marriage tie it is a
matter of joint, not single, personal status. If unloosed as to one
it must be so as to the other, and therefore, as a rule, it cannot be
justly done on the application of one party without hearing the
other. The hardship which may be thus caused to a party anxious
and entitled to be freed from a marriage whose vows have been
broken by the other, is no better gound for violating this principle
than would be the mutual disgust of married persons, which often
leads to a separation a mensa et thoro, for setting aside the invariable rule that marriage is indissoluble by consent of parties, and
permitting such persons to obtain, for such reasons only, a divorce
a vinculo.
The proposition which Mr. Bishop and some of the cases he cites
maintain, viz., that "a proceeding to fix the status of a citizen
does not differ from one in rem," is questionable. Judge REDFIELD denies it: 3 Am. L. Reg. 206. By nature the rights of
persons and the rights of things are very dissimilar. Nor does the
analogy which Mr. Bishop draws between a 8tatus and a rem, show
any points of resemblance.
Mr. Wharton's rule, that "proceedings" (in foreign divorce
suits) "must be according to the rules of international law prescribed as to foreign judgments," § 231 (which is entirely, inconsistent, as we have shown, with what he holds in regard to noticesee § 232), seems to us both logical and reasonable. As authorities elsewhere cited prove, to the validity of such a judgment in
personam, appearance by, or service of process on, the defendant,
is essential.
The Penn8ylvania rule a8 to the forum of a divorce suit.
In some cases the strict application of the rule laid down by
Judge REDFIELD and Mr. Wharton, and which, as we have labored
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to show, is perfectly logical, is very severe. Hence has resulted,
in some states, the allowance of certain exceptions to it in the
direction, but stopping far short, of Mr. Bishop's departure. In
Pennsylvania it has been established that "the injured party must
seek redress in the forum of the defendant, unless where the defendant has removed from what was before the common domicile
of both :" SIIARSWOOD, J., in Reel v. Elder, 62 Penna. St. 308;
or, as stated by the same judge in a later case, "the rule is that
suit must be brought either in the jurisdiction in which the injured
party resided at the time of the injury, or in the actual domicile
of the other party at the time of suit :" Platt's Appeal, 2 Weekly
Notes 501. Similar views were advanced by Judge SHAw,
in .1arteauv. ffarteau, supra. See also Turner v. Turner, 44
Ala. 487. In the opinion in Platt's Appeal it is further said:
"The cause of divorce did not arise in the state of Michigan,
neither did the parties reside therein. Mrs. Platt was not served
with process, neither did she appear to answer the libel." The
divorce in Michigan, where the husband resided, was held void,
at least in Pennsylvania.
These later enunciations of the law in Pennsylvania have somewhat modified the earlier one, as is evident from a comparison of
them. From the last case it would seem that appearance by, or
service of process on, a non-resident respondent, would give a
court of the libellant's domicile jurisdiction to decree a divorce
binding on both parties, and everywhere ; but the earlier case, and
Judge SHARSWOOD'S statement of the law in the later one, would
lead us to infer not only that such appearance and service are not
always necessary, but that they are not the proper criterion of a
valid divorce obtained in the libellant's domicile. The law as laid
down by GIBSON, 0. J., in Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts 349, is still
the law of Pennsylvania. "Jurisdiction once vested is not lost by
the departure" of the offending party: AGNEW, J., in Colvin v.
Reed, 55 Penna. St. 381.
The question still unsettled.
Despite the reasoning to the contrary, the weight of authority
in later cases inclines rather to Mr. Bishop's side. If his interpretation of Olheever v. Wilson, is the correct one, the matter is
beyond dispute, but this seems to us more than doubtful.
Until some further decision of the Supreme Court of the United
VOL. XXV.-26
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States shall establish this point, whether or not an appearance by,
or service of process on, the respondent, is essential to the international validity of a divorce granted in the domicile of one party
only, the conflict of laws and decisions in the courts of the several
states will still continue, for it will be uncertain what are the
requisites to enable courts to take jurisdiction of such cases, so
that their judgments shall be within the clause in the Constitution
of the United States giving them "full faith and credit" in other
states: 2 Bishop, § 199 a, &c.; 3 Am. Law Reg. 210; 2 Kent
110. So thorough has been Mr. Bishop's examination of the
authorities opposed to him, cited by Judge REDFIELD and others,
that it would be a work of supererogation to go over the ground
he has traversed. His own authorities will be found in the sections
cited from his work. See also Standridge v. Standridge, 31 Geo.
223; Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158.
There are still a number of minor, but not unimportant questions, connected with this subject which deserve mention.
1. As to the distinction between the effect of a foreign divorce
on personalstatus and rights of property.
In Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140 (A. D. 1832), this distinction appears to have been first promulgated, and it is approved by
Kent (2 Comm. 110, note b), by Bishop (2, § 169, &c.). Judge
REDFIELD repudiates it (3 Am. L. Reg. 215).
According to Mr. Bishop and those who think with him, a
'divorce may be effectual to release the parties from the bonds of
matrimony and entitle them to remarry, but still leave untouched
their rights in property in other states than that in which it was
iendered.
Of course if the defendant has appeared or been served with
process, a judgment against him will bind his estate wherever situated: 2 Bishop, § 170. In connection with this point no one
seems to have adverted to the well-established principle, that the
transmission and title of real estate are regulated wholly by the
lex rei sits, those of personal property almost equally by the lex
domicilii of the owner: Story Confl. of L., §§ 364--7, 376, 424,
&c. So that a proceeding to enforce a decree of a foreign court
for alimony and a suit for dower stand on a very different footing.
It is noticeable that in the two Pennsylvania cases (Colvin v. Reed,
55 Penna. St. 375, and Reel v. .Elder, 62 Id. 308), criticised by
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Mr. lishop in his discussion of this theory, the existence of this
distinction was not recognised. The divorces were held wholly
invalid in Pennsylvania, and therefore not to affect rights of dower
to land therein.
How far this discrimination as to the effects of a divorce is beneficial does not appear; it is certainly illogical. Nothing said in
the various authorities which support it at all weakens the force
of Judge REDFIELD'S remark (3 Am. L. Reg. 215), that it is absurd to deny the validity of a divorce "upon the mere incident of
alimony, while attempting to maintain it upon the principal cause
of action." However, there is but one case cited by Judge REDFIELD (Jackson v. Jackson, 4 Johns. 432) where this distinction
has been repudiated.
2. Divorce proceeding by a non-residentplaintiff.
Such a divorce on principle stands on rather better ground than
one where the non-resident defendant has appeared or been brought
into court. Such cases can occur but seldom, however, as most
of the states of this country require that the plaintiff should have
a residence in the state as an essential preliminary to bringing suit
for divorce: 2 Bishop, § 166.
3. Fraudulent seeking of another domicile for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce.
A judgment obtained by fraud is always invalid, and any judgment may be examined on this ground, even in a collateral proceeding: Story Confl. of L., §§ 597-608. But an investigation
into motives is always difficult, and its results apt to be vague and
indefinite. In the parallel case of parties going abroad to marry,
in order to avoid the requirements of the laws of their own country,
where such absence was but temporary, and the intent of the
parties plain, like the so-called Gretna Green marriages, certainly
a much stronger case, the English courts have uniformly held
such marriages good for all purposes. See Lord BROUGHAbi'S
judgment in WJarrenderv. Warrender,cited in Story, &c., § 226 c.
Some of the Continental jurists hold otherwise: 2 Kent 91.
Where the statutory period of residence has been fulfilled, it
may be strongly questioned whether a court will or ought to inquire
further. Undoubtedly there may arise cases where circumstances
create so strong a suspicion of bad faith as to induce a court to
receive proof of other facts and of declarations tending to the same
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conclusion. Any evidence of collusion, for instance, would be of
great weight: 2 Bishop, §§ 121, and cases cited, 191 a; William8
v. Williams, 3 R. I. 185; Brown v. Brown, 1 McCarter (N. J.)
78; Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray 367; Vischer v. Vischler, 12 Barb.
640. Whether the fact of residence, as found by the decree, is
primd facie or conclusive, is not settled: Cheever v. Tilson, 9
Wall. 123. Mr. Wharton says that courts "require proof of a
bondfide change of domicile somewhat higher than that of mere
removal and declaration :" Confl. of L., §§ 228-30. Domicile must
of course be bondfide: Story, &c., §§ 230, 230 a; the only question is how far the courts will investigate the motives with which
such domicile was acquired, supposing the term of residence
required by the laws of the state in which domicile is claimed, and
all other legal requisites, to have been fulfilled. Judge REDFIELD
says that a "fraudulent or pretended residence" will not give jurisdiction, and that the " bondfide character" of residence in another
state may be disproved, and that it may be shown to be "fraudulent and simulated :" Story Confl. of L., § 229 a.
This seems to leave untouched the question above suggested,
how far a residence can be "fraudulent or pretended" which has
all the legal qualifications of one. The case where the question
of the acquirement of a new domicile is purely a matter of intention, which often occurs in the distribution of the personal estate
of a decedent, is different. Here the intent of the party is evidenced by his bringing suit as a resident.
In Massachusetts it is declared by statute (Rev. Stats. 1885,
ch. 76, § 39) that divorces obtained by citizens thereof in another
state, who have resorted there for that purpose, "for any cause
occurring here, and whilst the parties resided here, or for any
cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this state,
shall be of no force or effect in this state." See also Story Confi.
of L. §§ 228-30.
The foregoing discussion has been followed out with the wish to
set forth as clearly as may be, and harmonize, if in any degree
possible, the differences of opinion and decision which exist on this
important topic, and which only the adoption of an International
Code of Divorce will entirely remove.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.
PHILADELPHIA.

